Top marginal tax rates are positively correlated with the pretax income growth of the bottom 90%those who are not subject to the top rates. To explain this correlation, this paper presents and tests a model in which executives can increase rm protability by: (i) increasing the rm's level of technology and (ii) decreasing labor costs. In the model, higher marginal tax rates may reduce pre-tax inequality by increasing the average income growth of workers. This hypothesis is tested by examining the eect of top marginal tax rates on (unobserved) relative bargaining power between labor and rms and, therefore, on the income growth of workers in the United States. Bargaining power, in both the theoretical and empirical model, is proxied by private-sector unionization and use of oshore labor resulting in higher imports.
Introduction
While income inequality has been the subject of much recent research, there has been little agreement about why inequality in the United States and many other countries has increased so dramatically from the mid-1970s to the present day. One school of thought has focused on skill-biased technological growth (e.g. Goldin and Katz [2009] ), in which demand for highly skilled labor has increased faster than its supply, increasing the return to education and thereby increasing inequality. While this process does seem to explain how the middle of the income distribution has become more spread out, it fails to account for the terric incomes at the very top of the distribution as documented by Piketty and Saez [2003] . Another school of thought, for example Frank and Cook [2010] , attributes the increase to winner-take-all markets in which those with the very highest skills have seen their reach extend globally and have reaped the economic rewards. But as Atkinson and Piketty [2007] have shown, increasing globalization, faced by all developed countries, has not had the same eect on top incomes around the world. In fact, the huge income increases at the top have taken place mainly in English-speaking countries, and not in continental Europe and Asia.
Recent work by Piketty et al. [2014] has shown that income tax policy is relevant to this debate. They show that higher marginal tax rates (MTRs) at the very top are associated with smaller pre-tax top income shares (and larger bottom income shares), both in the Unites States and in an OECD panel. This result is not surprising, and indeed agrees with standard economic theory. But Piketty et al. [2014] also show that neither the traditional labor supply elasticity nor the possibility of tax avoidance can account for much of the correlation. Instead, they nd support for a third elasticity in which executiveswho make up a signicant fraction of those at the top according to Bakija et al. [2010] have an incentive to increase their bargaining power when facing a lower MTR in order to increase their total compensation. In their main model, executives are able to increase their compensation by reducing the compensation of everybody else in the economy equally. They show in an online appendix that this model carries over to a hierarchical labor model in which executives reduce the compensation of those below them, but they say: The main diculty with this scenario is that it is dicult to obtain compelling direct evidence that the surge in top incomes did come at the expense of lower earners (Piketty et al. [2014] , p. 268).
This paper attempts to address that issue by focusing on factors that may aect the relative bargaining power of executives and labor in the United States. I propose a simple model in which executives can split their labor between increasing a rm's total factor productivity, increasing the rm's bargaining power over labor, and leisure. Lower MTRs induce them to work more (or at least harder), sacricing leisure. Depending on how they split the rest of their labor, their eorts may lead to a combination of two outcomes: higher economic growth and higher rm protability (at least pre-executive pay) on the one hand, and lower income growth for those not at the top on the other 1 . The lower income growth could reect a decrease in the bargaining power of labor. I test this model with long-term data in the United States using a full-information maximum likelihood structural equation model (FIML SEM), which allows the main endogenous variables to aect each other. The changes in bargaining power stem mainly from a reduction in labor unionization and rms' increasing reliance on oshore production, resulting in higher levels of imports. These two measures, both of which reduce income growth for workers, are very highly correlated with the MTR, and I show that a signicant fraction of the reduction in the real income growth of the bottom 90% can be explained by the change in the MTRs of the top 0.01%. On the other hand, I nd no evidence that lower MTRs for this group result in faster economic growth. Interestingly, the MTRs faced by the top 1% do seem to be negatively related to per capita growth. Milligan and Smart [2015] , in their work estimating tax elasticities in Canada, nd similar dierences between the top 1% and top 0.01%, at least at the provincial level. This suggests that instead of attening the federal tax code by reducing the number of brackets, the United States may want to return to a period 1 This model is completely consistent with the ideas in Kaplan [2012] in which CEOs are (appropriately) paid for performance or the empirical results of Bertrand and Schoar [2003] that show signicant eects of CEO performance on rm protability. In this model, CEOs get paid for increasing protability, the question here is whether this is done through TFP growth or through zero-sum compensation bargaining. of more tax brackets at the top with higher MTRs for subgroups within the top 1%. The political problem, from labor's point of view, is one of collective action as identied by Olson [1965] . As an amorphous group, especially as union membership has declined, labor nds it much more dicult to exert political pressure than do the handful of groups representing the top 0.01%.
Background of Top Marginal Tax Rates and Income Shares
In the United States over the post-WWII period, there has been a strong negative correlation between the top MTR and the pre-tax share of income of the top 1% and 0.01%. According to data from Piketty and Saez [2003] (updated online), the (non-capital gains) income share of the top 1% has grown from a low of 7.7% in 1973 to a pre-recession high of 18.3% in 2007.
The top 0.01% has seen even more signicant gains, increasing from just under 0.5% in 1973 to 3.6% in 2007. Over the same period the top federal marginal income tax rate fell from 70% to 35% (although those in the top 1% but below the very top faced a 50% MTR in 1973). According to Piketty and Saez [2003] , the 90-99th percentiles have seen their income share uctuate, varying between a low of 21% to a high of almost 31%. From 1974 to 2008 the share of this group increased from 24.2% to 27.9%.
The income share of the bottom 90% followed a dierent trajectory. But what do CEOs actually do? Classical economic theory says that they are hired by shareholders to maximize the rm's long-term prots (see Kaplan [2012] and Bertrand and Schoar [2003] for support of this theory). This relationship has been analyzed as a principalagent problem in which the goals of the CEO may dier from those of shareholders. But less has been said about the mechanisms through which CEOs are meant to increase prots. Gabaix and Landier [2008] propose a model in which executives have dierent talent levels which interact with rm size to explain the fact that while prot levels explain only a small fraction of CEO pay, rm size explains a lot (Tosi et al. [2000] ). A hint of one CEO task comes from both Banning and Chiles [2007] and Gomez and Tzioumis [2011] , both of which nd that CEOs of non-union rms earn more than CEOs in union rms. Think of a rm as an entity that takes inputs (labor, capital, technology, executive skill) and creates positive economic prots (or rents). It must then distribute those prots among its inputs. How they get distributed will depend on a number of factors, and these will reect the relative bargaining power of each group. For our purposes, the most relevant issue is the relative bargaining power of labor.
Traditionally, unions signicantly increased labor's bargaining power. Bluestone and Bluestone [1992] found that union workers earned 15-20% more than non-union workers 20 years ago. Recent work (Blanchower and Bryson [2003] , Blanchower and Bryson [2004] , Blackburn [2008 ], Hirsch [2008 ) nds that the wage dierential may be a bit lower, but is still at least 10%. Lemieux [2008] shows that declining union membership in the U.S. is likely one cause of increasing wage inequality.
In the 1970s and 1980s, union-management relations became more contentious. Kochan et al. [1986] believe this was due to increased competitive pressure from lower-cost labor abroad and non-union workers in the United States. They note that of the two million jobs lost in manufacturing in the early 1980s, half were union jobs. Bluestone and Bluestone [1992] note that as rms' prot levels began to decline two decades after WWII, one route managers took was to aggressively challenge the wage demands of their employees (p.67).
Walton et al. [1994] claim that managers opposed unions not only to increase their own exibility and the productivity of their workers, but also to reduce pay and benets, either in absolute terms or relative to their previous growth rates. Some recent research has found that an increased reliance on o-shore production has reduced wages for workers in similar industries (Autor et al. [2013] and Ebenstein et al. [2013] ), a nding supported in this paper, although other research (such as Gomez et al. [2013] ) nds less of an eect, at least for service sector employees.
The following section presents the model in which executives choose between leisure and work and decide on how to split their time between the two types of workincreasing a rm's total factor productivity and increasing the rm's bargaining power over labor. Section three tests the model's hypotheses with a time series data set for the United States. Section four concludes and oers steps for further research.
Model

Setup
There are an exogenous number of rms, n, in the market, producing a homogenous good.
There is also an unproduced good, M , serving as the numeraire. Following Lasselle and Svizzero [2005] , rms compete in a Cournot oligopoly in the produced good. The total demand curve depends on its price and total disposable income in the economy (I + M ):
The two main assumptions are that demand is decreasing in price and increasing in total income:
Firms are assumed to be large enough in their market that they possess some market power, but small enough in the total economy that they take income as given (as in Hart [1982] ). Each rm's demand curve will depend on total income and the production of the rest of the rms in the market:
Firms produce according to the production function:
Where A j is the rm's level of technology, L D is domestic labor and L F is foreign labor.
I assume that domestic labor is paid the endogenous wage, ω, and foreign labor is paid the exogenous wage,ω, where I assume that ω >ω. The production function, f (·, ·) is assumed to be increasing and at least weakly concave in both inputs. The productivity of domestic labor is assumed to be greater than that of foreign labor,
there is assumed to be a (rm-specic) xed cost of producing overseas of ∆ j (L 
For a given market price, p j , and with rm production equal to rm demand (y j = q j ), rm prot is then: 
There are three distinct types of agents in the model: workers (N i ), shareholders (N s ), and executives (N e ). I assume that workers make up the bulk of the population so that:
The focus of this model is the role of the head of the rm, the chief executive ocer (CEO). While CEOs can have a number of incentives (minimizing risk, increasing tenure, building reputation, etc.), this paper assumes that the CEO's goal is to maximize utility, which depends on consumption and leisure. The CEO's pay is assumed to be directly related to prots. In this model, prots increase with the level of technology (A j ) and decrease with the wage rate paid to workers (ω). CEOs can split their time (e) between encouraging the rm to improve the level of technology (e A ) or by decreasing the wage rate (e ω ) (through bargaining, reducing the power of unions, sending production oshore, etc.), or leisure (l).
In return, I make the simplifying assumption that CEOs are paid some fraction, γ, of the rm's prots 3 .
Executives make up a mass of N e of the population. Total executive income is I e = j (γ(π j )de and disposable income is I D e =´j(1 − τ e )γ(π j )de.
The remainder of prots, (1 − γ)π j , are distributed to shareholders who are assumed to be distinct from the workers of the rms. Shareholders, with a mass of N s , receive a share of the rm's prots as their income. Total income for shareholders is then I s =´j(1 − γ)π j ds
Because rms can choose to produce domestically and/or oshore, imports from rm j will equal:
Government has to fund some exogenous level of spendingḠ with tax revenue from executives, shareholders, and workers. The government's budget constraint is then:
The average tax rate in the economy is then:
Total demand comes from workers, shareholders, executives and the government and must, in equilibrium, be equal to total output as there is no investment in this economy.
However, the output that is produced oshore, with foreign labor, will be classied as imports, so that consumption is:
Total nominal output is:
Which can be broken into domestic output and imports (production done oshore):
And the national accounting identity (setting domestic output equal to domestic demand minus imports) equal to total domestic income:
As described above, workers are not able to split their time and must either work or not.
For the sake of simplicity, I assume that workers are homogenous and have a reservation wage equal to ω R . So long as there is demand for their labor and the oered wage is above this reservation wage, workers will supply labor to the rms. In order for workers to be hired in equilibrium the realized wage, ω j , must be between the workers' reservation wage and the wage at which rm prots are zero, ω 0 , which can be above the worker's marginal product when there are positive economic prots. In addition, I assume that the exogenous foreign wage rate,ω, is less than the reservation wage:
While the wage rate for foreign workers is (assumed) xed atω, the wage rate for domestic workers depends on the relative bargaining power between workers and executives (as representatives of the rms), z j . In a perfectly competitive labor market with full information, workers are paid their marginal product
worker's marginal product can be dicult, if not impossible, to observe and there are frictional costs associated with nding a new job or new workers. Therefore there will be some surplus created by each worker-rm match (as in Mortensen and Pissarides [1994] ), which will be split depending on the relative bargaining power of workers and rms.
I assume that the bargaining power of a rm, z j , depends on the rm's ability to move work oshore (which, in turn, depends on the rm's xed cost of oshoring, ∆ j (L F j )) and the unionization rate in the rm's industry (un j ). The rm's bargaining power, z j L F j , un j , will be increasing in its use of oshore labor and decreasing in the unionization of its workforce.
How much oshore labor a rm uses will depend on the relative marginal and xed costs.
Assuming thatω < ω j , rms with a lower xed cost of oshoring and/or greater production (so that the average xed cost is lower) will use more oshore labor, lowering marginal costs and increasing prots. Executives can spend time and eort on reducing the power of labor to organize and form unions, e z , or they can spend time and eort increasing the level of technology in the rm, e A .
I assume that the level of unionization, un j , and the rm's cost of oshore production, ∆ j , are functions of executive eort in that area, e z . That is, executives can spend some of their eort reducing unionization levels in their rm or decreasing their cost of producing with less costly foreign labor. This increases the rm's bargaining power, z j , and allows the rm to reduce the average wage rate in the rm, reducing marginal costs and increasing prots. This may take the form of direct anti-union activities in the workplace or lobbying state or federal government for more corporate-friendly policies; such lobbying eorts could include supporting right-to-work laws and opposing laws that make unionization easier (see Campolieti et al. [2013] and Lipset et al. [2005] for a U.S.-Canada comparison that shows more direct anti-union action in Canada, likely due to weaker U.S. union power). Eort on the part of executives to increase the rm's bargaining power could include forming partnerships with overseas companies, scouting overseas locations, and any other activity that will make o-shore production easier.
In addition to increasing a rm's bargaining power vis-a-vis labor, an executive can spend eort on increasing the rm's level of technology. This will reduce marginal costs and increase prots. For example, Bloom et al. [2013] nd that better management techniques signicantly increase productivity in India, with managerial time being one of the constraints on such practices being more widely adopted.
I assume that returns to both types of an executive's labor are increasing in terms of prots and are (at least weakly) concave:
The CEO has one unit of time/eort available each period so that the time constraint is given by:
and must pay a tax rate on income of τ e < 1. CEOs receive utility from both consumption, c, and leisure, l. Utility is assumed to be increasing and concave in both arguments. Because there is no savings in this model, consumption is simply equal to after-tax income. We can summarize the CEO's problem as:
where the executive is making the individual decisions about how to split his time and eort and also choosing the rm's prot maximizing levels of domestic and foreign labor.
Substituting in for consumption, c, and leisure, l, and allowing f 1 and f 2 to be the partial derivative of the production function with respect to domestic and foreign labor, respectively, and z 1 and z 2 to be the rst derivative of the bargaining power with respect to foreign labor and unionization levels, respectively, we get the FOCs:
Combining (9) and (10) we get:
Equation (13) says that executives will equate the marginal benet of each type of eort.
Equations (11) and (12) equate the marginal product of each type of labor with its marginal revenue. The interesting part of (12) is the additional term
shows the additional benet to the rm of using foreign labor in that it reduces the wage of domestic workers by increasing a rm's bargaining power. Combining (11) and (12), the rm equates the marginal product of each type of labor with its marginal cost:
Executives will also adjust work and leisure so that the marginal benet of leisure is equal to the marginal benet of work (in terms of additional consumption):
Where u l and u c are the marginal utility of leisure and consumption, respectively. Equation (15) shows that as the tax rate faced by executives increases (so that the LHS decreases), executives will increase leisure and decrease consumption (and, therefore, work time/eort).
With this model, we can see the eects of a change in the top MTR not only on the
, but also on the growth rates of income for executives and for workers. Through (14) and (15), an increase in the executive's MTR, τ e , induces the executives to provide less eort in both increasing the rms' bargaining position and increasing the rm's technology. This has two eects on a worker's wage. First, it will increase unionization, raising the workers' bargaining power and pushing workers' wages closer to their marginal product. However, because it will reduce the value of A j , it will also reduce the worker's marginal product, potentially reducing the wage, depending on the strength of the two eects.
The executive tax rate also enters into the rm's prot-maximizing decision in (15) through the eect of e z on bargaining power, and, therefore, the relative marginal costs of domestic vs. foreign labor. A higher MTR reduces eort, e z , which in turn increases unionization levels which increases the domestic wage rate and should decrease the amount of domestic labor used.
This leads to the following testable hypotheses:
• H1: An increase in the top MTR should lead to a decrease in each rm's level of technology and, therefore, slower real GDP per capita growth.
• H2: An increase in the top MTR should lead to a decrease in each rm's bargaining power towards labor, leading to lower (pre-executive pay) corporate prots as a share of total income.
• H3a: An increase in the top MTR should lead to an increase in private-sector unionization.
• H3b: An increase in the top MTR should lead to a decrease in reliance on oshore production and, therefore, a decrease in imports as a percent of GDP.
Because wage growth depends positively on the growth in TFP (A j ) and negatively on the rm's bargaining power, z j , the eect of an increase of the top MTR (which is hypothesized to reduce both A j and z j ) is ambiguous and must be left to the empirical results. However, we can say:
• H4: If the TFP eect of a change in the top MTR dominates the bargaining eect, then an increase in the top MTR will reduce income growth for workers. If the opposite is true, then an increase in the top MTR will lead to an increase in the income growth of workers.
There may be general equilibrium eects not captured in the four hypotheses above. Inspecting equation (6), GDP will depend on the overall level of technology and total domestic labor used. The model assumes that a higher tax on executives will lead to a lower level of technological growth (as executives supply less e A ). It will also lead to higher unionization, higher wages, and, therefore, less domestic labor used. On the other hand, domestic demand depends (one-for-one) on domestic income, or GDI 4 . A higher executive tax rate will lead to a pre-tax income redistribution between workers and executives/shareholders as the labor share of income increases and prot decreases. While this redistribution does not aect demand in the model, aggregate demand will be reduced by rms substituting foreign labor for domestic. Cheaper foreign labor, however, will reduce rms' marginal costs, reducing prices but increasing prots 5 . The net eect on real GDP growth, as opposed to H1, is unclear but will be tested in the next section.
3 Empirical tests
Data
The data set used in this section is a time series combination of U.S. tax data (Piketty for each top income group. There has been substantial variation in the tax rates faced by these two groups, and as noted above, the concentration of executives appears to increase as we move up the income distribution.
The mechanism in the model through which executives are able to reduce average wage growth depends on the rm's bargaining power which, in turn, depends on unionization levels and use of foreign labor. A lower MTR induces executives to work more (or more intensively), splitting their time between increasing the rm's level of technology (and productivity) and increasing bargaining power. This implies that a decrease in the top MTR should lead to lower private union membership which in turn should lead to lower wage growth for workers. I use the the average income growth of the bottom 90% (as opposed to income shares as in Piketty et al. [2014] ) as a stand-in for average wage growth of the workers. Similarly, because total executive pay is not available, I will use the share of the top 1% and 0.01% as a measure of this income group. In order to focus on long-term trends rather than business cycle eects, I have smoothed the annual data of all growth rates using a Hodrick-Prescott lter 7 . Summary statistics are presented in Table 1 . I focus on the growth, both of real GDP per capita and in real average income of the bottom 90%, rather than the level, because of the implications of the model in section 2. In the model, executives face a trade-o every period in where to focus their eort, which is, in turn, inuenced by their marginal tax rate.
This implies that a higher marginal tax rate will be associated with higher growth in income for the bottom 90% whereas the level will mainly depend on the previous period's level. The use of the H-P lter is meant to identify the contemporaneous eects in the long-run trend of the variables. How well it does this depends on how well it lters out the business cycle eects within the variables 8 .
In addition to the total time period , I also provide a breakdown for what is considered the high growth period I focus on the top 1% and the top 0.01% because of the likelihood that these groups include the greatest number of executives with inuence over the greatest number of employees. For example, Piketty and Saez [2003] note that in 2006 the average pay of the top 100 CEOs (including salary, bonus, and exercised stock options) was over $55 million, putting them comfortably in the top 0.01%. In addition, the tax data shows that there is a signicant dierence between the threshold income level of the top 1% and the top 0.01%.
8 Jones [1995] nds that real GDP per capita growth is stationary. That is, using the Dickey-Fuller test, we can reject the null hypothesis that there is a unit root in the data. He uses this fact to show that there are signicant problems with much of the endogenous growth theory literature in which the (increasing, non-stationary) explanatory variables, such as capital investment, levels of human capital, etc., are used to explain a stationary variable which appears to simply uctuate around a trend line. The analysis here could suer from the same problems and I address this issue in Appendix A. The takeaway from that analysis is that while the full data for growth (real GDP, bottom 90%, top 1%) does appear to be stationary, the Dickey-Fuller test on the H-P trend of these variables fails to reject non-stationarity. Furthermore, there is evidence of cointegration between the endogenous variables in the model and fully-modied OLS regressions of the structural equations nds coecients of similar magnitude and signicance to those presented below in Table 2 .
In nominal dollars, and not including capital gains, the 1973 thresholds respectively were $45,500 and $242,900 (or a ratio of 5.34). By 2007 these thresholds had increased to $347,600 and $6,886,000 (or a ratio of 19.8). There has also been much less variation in the MTR for those just in the top 1% in the post-WWII period (a range of 28-54% with a standard deviation of 7.2) as opposed to the top 0.01% (ranging from 28-89% with a standard deviation of 20.1).
The small size of the top 0.01%, about 15,000 households, also implies that this group is more likely to be able to overcome the collective action problem rst noted by Olson [1965] .
Indeed, given that this group has control over the most nancial resources, it would require only a small minority involved in lobbying the political system to have a potentially large eect. The bottom 90%, on the other hand, has a much harder row to hoe to overcome the collective action problem. In the earlier decades of this sample, unions were able to help One area which the model is not able to control for is the treatment of corporate vs. personal income. There have been a number of changes to the tax code in how business income is treated and taxed. However, as Piketty and Saez [2003] have shown, the main increase in income for the top 0.01% has been from wage and salary income and from business income, which has increasingly come from S-corporations after the 1981 and 1986 tax reform (Saez et al. [2012] ) and which is taxed at personal income rates. This likely makes the personal marginal tax rate faced by those at the top of the income distribution the most relevant one for executives, and I use it to test this model.
Structural Equation Model Estimation
While the model oers a straightforward explanation of how the MTRs faced by executives inuence wage and productivity growth, in reality the picture must be much more muddied.
While the top MTRs may aect growth in per capita real GDP, real GDP growth will certainly inuence the growth rate in the average income of the bottom 90%. Similarly, if executives work to reduce the inuence of unions, unions will certainly work to reduce the inuence of executives, perhaps by lobbying for higher top MTRs. In addition, increased purchasing power by the bottom 90% could lead rms to produce more, increasing growth in per capita real GDP and corporate prots. On the other hand, a larger presence of private unions in the economy may reduce economic growth by making rms less exible. This implies that there is a positive feedback mechanism in the model in which executives are able to increase their bargaining power which then leads to lower labor power, lower marginal tax rates, and more executive bargaining power. Of course, the feedback loop appeared to be working in the opposite direction earlier in the sample period.
In order to control for this endogeneity, I use a full-information maximum likelihood structural equation model. This allows a measure of direct eects, such as the eect of top MTRs on unionization and imports, but also allows for indirect eects. For example, while I do not include the top MTRs in the structural equation for the growth rate of the average income for the bottom 90% (eqn (i) below) they are included as structural variables in the equations determining unionization rates and imports. Because these variables enter into the growth of average income for the bottom 90%, we can see the indirect eect the top tax rates have on worker income. The direct and indirect eects add up to the total eect and all three are reported below.
The eight structural equations in the model are:
The constant, α k , is allowed to vary by equation k, and the endogenous variables in the model are (i) the average income growth of the bottom 90%, g ωt , (ii) real GDP growth per capita, g yt , (iii) private union membership as a percentage of private employees, union t , (iv) imports as a percentage of GDP, imp t , (v) corporate prots as a percentage of GDP, Πt /Yt, 9 While the dummy time period variables might not be controversial choices for exogeneity, the others may require more explanation. I assume that average federal taxes and average income are not aected by the relative bargaining power between labor and executives, but only the relative weight faced by each group. That is, given an exogenous total tax revenue requirement,Ḡ in the model, how the various groups pay is what is endogenous to the model. Exports are assumed to vary due to international macroeconomic and political causes outside the model, and the determination of the political variables is outside the scope of this model and are also assumed to be exogenous. The rst hypothesis, H1, in section 2 is that higher marginal top tax rates will reduce economic growth as those at the top reduce their eort. Column (ii) provides mixed support for this hypothesis. There does seem to be strong evidence that higher MTRs for the top 1% do have negative eects on growth both directly and indirectly. The total eect implies that a 1 percentage point increase in the top MTR reduces growth in real GDP per capita by 0.163 percentage points. On the other hand, the direct eect of the MTR on the top 0.01% is positive, as is the total eect, although only signicant at the 10% level. Recall that the percent of executives in the top percentiles increases as we move up the income ladder. It could be that there is a more traditional labor supply responses to MTRs among the top 1% than there is among the top 0.01%. The dierence between the eects of the two tax rates will be a recurring theme in these results.
The second hypothesis, H2, is that higher top MTRs should lead to lower corporate prots as executives expend less eort in bargaining and labor costs increase. From column (v), higher MTRs for the top 1% do have a negative eect on corporate prots, but once again, the eect is the opposite for the top MTRs of the top 0.01%. One possibility is that these corporate prots are, by necessity, measured post executive pay. If top MTRs reduce executive pay, as was found by Piketty et al. [2014] , then it would make sense for higher 10 3SLS results are similar in sign to the direct eects reported here although coecients tend to be larger in absolute value and more likely to be signicant.
MTRs for the top 0.01% (those best paid executives) to increase total corporate prots by reducing executive pay.
The relative bargaining power of the rm is captured by the next two hypotheses, H3a and H3b, which state that higher top MTRs should increase (private sector) unionization and decrease the use of oshore production (and, therefore, imports) . Column (iii) shows that the direct eect on unionization of the top 0.01% MTR supports this hypothesis, but the coecient on the MTR for the top 1% has a negative sign. A one percentage point increase in the MTR for the top 0.01% has a direct increase of 0.216 percentage points on private sector unionization. And while the direct eect of private sector unionization on income growth for the bottom 90% is not statistically signicant, the indirect eect is quite signicant, mainly working through the increase in imports. So while column (iv) shows that the eects of the top MTRs on imports is fairly ambiguous and, in general, not statistically signicant, there is a signicantly negative direct eect of imports on the income growth for workers, and an increase in imports leads to a large and signicant decrease in unionization (and an increase in prots). This leads to a signicantly positive indirect (and total) eect of unionization levels on worker income growth.
There is no direct path for the top MTRs to aect the growth in average income of the bottom 90%, but we see that the indirect eects are both signicant, although of opposite sign. Given the eects of the top MTRs on growth, this is what was expected from our fourth hypothesis, which stated that if higher top MTRs decreased real GDP growth, then it was possible they would decrease growth of average incomes for the bottom 90% (as is the case for the MTR for the top 1%). On the other hand, if increases in the top MTR did not decrease economic growth, as is the case for the top 0.01%, then higher top MTRs were likely to increase growth for the bottom 90%. Column (i) shows that a one percentage point increase in the MTR of the top 0.01% leads to an increase in growth for the bottom 90% of 0.084 percentage points while a one percentage point increase in the MTR for the top 1% decreases the growth rate for the bottom 90% by 0.301 percentage points.
While these results do not show causality, the correlations are in line with the theory presented in section 2. The size of the estimated coecients implies that the change in the relative bargaining power between labor and rms as shown by the drop in the average MTR of the top 0.01% from the 1948-1973 period to the 1974-2008 period has the potential to explain most of the shrinkage in income growth for the bottom 90%. These eects seem to be mainly coming from the eect of the top MTRs on union membership (iii), real GDP growth (ii), and imports (iv). Higher MTRs for the top 0.01% increase private unionization, which in turn increases growth for the bottom 90% (mainly through lower import levels).
The MTR for the top 1% has the opposite eect on unionization. The eects on imports is a little less clear, but higher top MTRs seem to decrease imports (although not signicantly), while imports in turn reduce average income growth for the bottom 90%. Again, the eect for the MTR of the top 1% is the opposite.
Finally, columns (vii) and (viii) show that higher private sector unionization does lead to higher top MTRs, providing some evidence for the struggle over bargaining power and the potential positive feedback loop over which income group will end up paying the country's tax bill. The model also provides some reason to be wary of increasingly freer trade. In support of the model, imports do increase corporate prots by reducing labor costs. However, in the model, and in the econometric results, increases in trade reduce the bargaining power of workers and reduce the growth rate in their average incomes, in the share of wages and salaries, and, at least in these results, in total growth in real GDP per capita. This is consistent with ndings from Autor et al. [2013] and Ebenstein et al. [2013] , but it would be interesting to divide up trade between countries of similar labor costs, in which traditional comparative advantage arguments may hold, and trade between countries with disparate levels of development in which the eects of this type of model may be dominant.
Conclusion
The main contribution of this paper is to show how top MTRs may aect the pre-tax distribution of income, not only by reducing the income of those at the very top (as would be suggested by standard economic theory) but also by increasing the growth of income for the bottom 90%. The model presented here suggests that executives will work more (or more intensively) to increase bargaining power of the rm and decrease their labor costs when they face lower MTRs, increasing their income and decreasing that of their workers.
At the same time, they may work harder to increase rm-level productivity so that lower top MTRs will yield to faster growth. Overall, the model suggests that higher top MTRs on the top 1% can hurt economic growth (which can then hurt workers), while increasing the top MTR on the top 0.01%, a group which includes the highest paid CEOs in the largest companies, has only positive eects for economic growth in total and for the bottom 90%.
The model implies that there can be a positive feedback loop in which one group nds it easier to increase its bargaining power at the expense of the other group as it increases its share of the economic pie.
Taken all together, the results in section 3 imply that while there is support for the assumption that top 0.01% executives have an eect on the rm's wage bill and will work harder to reduce it when they face a lower MTR, especially by reducing private sector unionization, they have little eect on technological growth (although there is a negative eect on growth from the top tax rate for the top 1%). On a macroeconomic level, therefore, while the pre-tax distribution of income seems to have changed signicantly over time due to changing top MTRs, there is no negative eect on growth from (much) higher tax rates for the very richest. In fact, the data show a positive relationship between the top MTR and overall GDP growth. This implies that there may be an aggregate demand eect of changing the top MTR in which higher wages for the bottom 90% boost overall demand leading to an increase in supply, higher growth rates, and higher corporate prots. 11 . Jones's argument is that if a variable is stationary it will return to its long-run trend. If the explanatory variables in the model are all trending up or downfor example, physical capital investment, human capital levels, or resources devoted to R&Dthen the theory fails the empirical test. And there is little question that, using annual data, non-stationarity in real GDP per capita growth can be rmly rejected using the Dickey-Fuller or Phillips-Perron test. In fact, these tests reject non-stationarity in all of the growth variables in the model as 11 My thanks to an anonymous reviewer who raised these objections and suggested this line of reasoning.
well as annual growth in average income for the top 1% and top 0.01%. But in the pre-1974 range, the average annual income growth for these top two groups averaged 0.78% and 0.06%
respectively. In the 1974-2008 time period, average annual growth increased to 3.14% for the top 1% and 6.34% for the top 0.01%. Yet the MacKinnon approximate p-value on the Dickey-Fuller tests for these two variables is less than 0.00001, allowing us to condently reject non-stationarity. Table 3 presents the p-value of two unit root tests for the endogenous variables in the SEM regressions presented above, as well as for annual growth in average incomes for those at the top. There are signicant dierences between the annual data and the H-P trend.
The tests are unable to reject non-stationarity for any of the H-P trend variables.
[ Table 3 about here] Figure 3 shows observed annual data and the calculated H-P trend for these growth variables. While the eye test says that the trend in real GDP per capita growth is perhaps the most likely to be stationary (at least after WWII), the others appear clearly not to be.
Average income growth for the bottom 90% is clearly positive until the mid-1970s and then basically zero after that. Average income growth for both the top 1% and the top 0.01% has the opposite pattern in which it was close to zero or even negative until the mid-1970s and has been quite positive since then.
[ Figure 3 about here.] This suggests that the business cycle may be interfering in tests for stationarity. Because recessions are followed by expansions, and vice versa, the standard tests for stationarity may be setting themselves up for failure when looking for long-run changes in the trend.
As we have seen, using the trend data calculated by applying the H-P lter, unit-root tests fail to reject the null-hypothesis of non-stationarity (Table 3) . If this is the case, tests for cointegration should be used to check for a long-run relationship between the variables. Table 4 estimates the cointegrating rank of the structural equations in the model. There is signicant evidence of cointegration between the variables in almost all of the structural equations.
[ Table 4 about here]
This evidence of cointegration implies that a method such as fully-modied OLS (FMOLS) may be appropriate in identifying these long-run relationships. Table 5 presents FMOLS results for each of the structural equations (i)-(viii) while using the H-P trend data in the same way as Table 2 . In addition, I present Dynamic OLS (DOLS) results using the (non-H-P trend) annual data. DOLS allows for a lead and lag of the explanatory variables. This is not dissimilar to taking the H-P trend which uses lags and leads to separate the cyclical eect from the long-run trend. Of course, the non-trend data, according to the unit-root tests in Table 3 , are stationary, so this may not be an appropriate method. I also provide the direct eects from the SEM maximum-likelihood regressions in Table 2 for comparison.
[ Table 5 Direct, indirect, and total eects from using FIML to regress 8 structural equations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *,**,***: statistically signicant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels Direct, indirect, and total eects from using FIML to regress 8 structural equations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *,**,***: statistically signicant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels Direct, indirect, and total eects from using FIML to regress 8 structural equations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *,**,***: statistically signicant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels Top 1% Marginal Fed Tax Rate 6 3 * Excludes dummy variables for Great Depression, WWII, and Democratic President due to collinearity. ** Largest rank for which trace statistic is larger than the 5% critical value. Includes two lags. 
